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Information systems (IS) security is traditionally seen as technically-oriented. Technologies 
alone, however, cannot secure an organization’s information systems at an optimal level. As 
such, scholars have called for more research on non-technical factors that play an important 
role in IS security, including human, managerial, and organizational issues. This paper aims to 
review and synthesize those studies that have been done on non-technical issues by applying 
knowledge management concepts as a tool and lens. It also identifies some issues that require 
further research. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
Managing information system security is a big challenge for organizations because they rely 
increasingly on information technologies to carry out their business activities. If not properly 
managed, systems could be broken and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information could be compromised. Such security breaches can be costly for organizations. For 
example, the network of the TJX Companies, Inc. (TJX) was compromised in 2005 and 2006 
and the security breach was estimated to cost the company more than 25 million US dollars 
(TJX, 2007a, 2007b). 
Given the magnitude and the financial impact of security breaches on businesses, it is important 
that we can learn from those incidents happened and understand what the causes are in order to 
prevent such breaches in the future. There is little theoretical guide, however, for such 
endeavor. The majority of the information systems (IS) security literature is based on expert’s 
opinion, anecdotal evidence, or experience (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). One of the possible 
reasons is that security is often regarded as technology-oriented. Prior research has emphasized 
mostly on technical issues as advanced encryption algorithms, authentication technologies, 
anti-virus, firewalls, and so forth. Technical solutions alone, however, do not guarantee 
security. Many systems have not been designed to be secure (ISO/IEC, 2005). In order to 
improve IS security, scholars have called for more research efforts on organizational problems, 
management issues and human behavior issues (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta & 
McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995). 
This paper aims to review these non-technical security issues from a knowledge management 
perspective. This is because IS security management is a knowledge-intensive activity that 
 
 
depends heavily on IS professionals’ expertise and skills (Belsis et al, 2005). Furthermore, an 
organization’s IS security is also dependent on IS users’ awareness of security issues, 
particularly how their IS behaviors affect the security of the overall information systems. The 
paper applies knowledge management concepts, specifically knowledge management ontology 
as a tool and lens to review research in information systems security. By exploring relevant 
knowledge and knowledge activities in IS security, this paper closes with a discussion of some 
issues that require further study.  
2 Knowledge Management Ontology 
Ontology is a simplified and explicit specification of a phenomenon (Gruber, 1995). In the 
knowledge management (KM) context, a general-purpose ontology is proposed by Holsapple 
and Joshi (2003; 2004) as a foundation for KM research, study, and practice. In their KM 
ontology, knowledge management is “an entity’s systematic and deliberate efforts to expand, 
cultivate, and apply available knowledge”. An entity’s knowledge management work can be 
seen as composed of “episodes”.  KM episode is defined as the entity’s execution of some 
configuration of knowledge manipulation activities (KMA). Such activities are carried by some 
processors, who operating on available knowledge resources, with the intent to satisfy a 
knowledge need or opportunity. The activities are governed by various types of influences, 
which are those factors that determine how the entity manipulates knowledge. KMAs also 
result in learning and/or projections of knowledge. Projection refers to the emission of 
resources such as knowledge and products into the external environment. 
In this KM ontology, two concepts are of particular interest here. The first one is learning, 
which is defined as 1) a process where knowledge resources are modified; and 2) an outcome 
of a knowledge management episode that involves the change in the state of the entity’s 
knowledge. Learning can be functional or dysfunctional. The former indicates a positive 
change while the latter involves negative change in the state of the entity’s knowledge. 
Learning also occurs whenever knowledge processors detect and correct errors (Argyris, 1995). 
The learning process can be better explained with a theory-in-use model (Argyris et al, 1985). 
The model depicts the relationship among three concepts: governing variables, action 
strategies, and consequences. According to this model, people’s action strategies are decided by 
governing variables, which are the values that people seek to satisfy; action strategies have 
intended consequences, which people expect to satisfy the global variables. Consequences give 
feedback to action strategies and governing variables. There are two forms of learning when the 
consequences are unintended: single-loop learning and double-loop learning. In the former 
situation, people try to change their actions while in the latter situation it is the governing 
variables that are to be changed. 
The second concept of interest is knowledge resource, which is defined as the knowledge that 
an entity can manipulate in ways to yield value. Knowledge resource is one of the four classes 
of organizational resources (the other three are financial, human resources, and material 
resources). Knowledge resource can be further analyzed in detailed components. There are two 
classes of knowledge resources: schematic knowledge and content knowledge. Schematic 
knowledge, which depends on the existence of the entity, has four components: culture, 
infrastructure, strategy, and purpose; content knowledge, which on the other hand exists 
 
 
independently of the entity to which it belongs, has two components: artifacts and participants’ 
knowledge. Each of the components is defined as follows: 
Culture. An organization’s culture refers to the basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by 
its members. It includes the organization’s values, principles, norms, traditions, unwritten rules, 
and informal procedures. 
Infrastructure. An organization’s infrastructure refers to the kind of knowledge that defines the 
organization’s roles, the inter-relationships, and the regulations that govern the use of these 
roles and relationship. It can be viewed as the counterpart of the culture component of 
knowledge resource. 
Purpose. An organization’s purpose defines its reason for existence. It includes mission, vision, 
objectives, and goals. Purpose is a directional knowledge with which other schematic 
knowledge components are to be aligned. 
Strategy. An organization’s strategy defines what to do in order to accomplish its purpose. The 
strategy may consist of plans for using organizational resources, which includes other 
knowledge resource components. 
Knowledge artifact. A knowledge artifact is an object that is the representation of knowledge 
that may be usable to knowledge processors in an organization. It is one of the knowledge 
contents that can exist independent of the organization that holds it. Examples of knowledge 
artifacts include books, reports, documents, videos, among others. 
Participants’ knowledge. This refers the kind of knowledge that is possessed by employees and 
others who participate in the organization’s business activities. In addition to employees, 
participants also include customer, partners, suppliers, as well as computer systems. 
The above ontology gives a fairly complete picture of knowledge management by identifying 
its major components and the interplays among these components. It provides some guidelines 
for using knowledge management approaches as a tool to investigate issues related to 
knowledge-intensive activities such as IS security management in organizations. 
3 IS Security from a Knowledge Management Perspective 
In IS security management, one problem needs to be addressed is how organizations manage 
security-related knowledge, because IS security management is a knowledge-intensive activity 
that depends heavily on IS professionals’ expertise and skills (Belsis et al., 2005). An 
organization’s IS security is also dependent on IS users’ awareness of security issues, 
particularly how their IS behaviors affect the security of the overall information systems. From 
knowledge management ontology perspective, the following three aspects stand out in the IS 






Scholars in IS field have long been advocating more research efforts on organizational 
problems, management issues and human behavior issues (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta 
& McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995). Indeed, many security problems can be attributed to 
these factors. Prior research has found that human error is a significant problem for IS security 
(Im & Baskerville, 2005). Im and Baskerville classified three levels of human error that pose as 
threats to IS security: 1) skill-based errors, which attribute to mainly monitoring failures; 2) 
rule-based errors, which arise if good rules are misapplied or bad rules are applied; and 3) 
knowledge-based errors, which are caused by the fact that related knowledge is nearly always 
incomplete and often inaccurate. These types of errors are from a rational viewpoint, which 
define errors simply as deviation from expected behavior (Neumann, 1995). 
Another view regards human error as complex and socially constructed behavior. According to 
the action theory (Argyris, 1986; Argyris et al., 1985), such errors or misunderstandings are 
created by individuals who unconsciously follow their theories-in-use, a form of “skilled 
incompetence”. Argyris et al (1985) distinguish two kinds of theories of action: espoused 
theory is what individuals claim to follow; and theories-in-use on the other hand are those that 
can be inferred from their action. It is argued that security problems happen when system users’ 
espoused theory and their theory-in-use are contradictory (Mattia & Dhillon, 2003). An 
organization’s espoused-theories may be embedded in its goals, mission, and formal 
documents. Based on this argument, Mattia and Dhillon suggest that the double-loop learning 
proposed by Argyris et al (1985) can be used as a strategy for designing and implementing 
security actions that bring an organization’s espoused-theory and theory-in-use into 
congruence. 
More specifically, Mattia and Dhillon argue that operational and technical controls, which are 
used for routine security activities or emergency situations are types of “single-loop learning” 
in Argyris et al’s terms. In other words, such controls focus on the “means” that reach the end 
result. In a double-loop learning situation, on the other hand, security practices should not only 
focus on the means but also pay attention to the frame or conceptualization of the problem. In 
other words, in double-loop security, assumptions underlying management controls should be 
questioned. A double-loop security design is proposed by Mattia and Dhillon to include 
learning that leads to new security solution, which could be either new actions or new problem-
solving. The design has four basic steps: 1) discovering espoused theories and theories in use; 
2) bringing the two into congruence and identifying new governing variables; 3) generating 
new actions; and 4) generalizing consequences into an organizational match. 
3.2 Knowledge resources 
Based on the KM ontology (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004), there are six categories of knowledge: 
culture, infrastructure, purpose, strategy, artifacts, and participants’ knowledge. The first four 
are schematic knowledge and the last two are content knowledge. 
3.2.1 Purpose and Strategy 
While it is generally understood that the purpose of security is to achieve confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of business information, there has not been many studies on what 
kind of strategy that organizations should take to accomplish this purpose, although there is no 
 
 
shortage of studies to seek innovative and robust technological solutions such as encryption and 
access control. 
One exception is the discussion by Parker (1997). In terms of the purpose of IS security, Parker 
argues that the need of confidentiality is decreasing, i.e. fewer kinds of information require 
confidentiality. On the other hand, the importance of ownership, control, integrity, and 
authenticity of information is increasing. As such, organizations may need to reconsider the 
military-origin classification of information, such as what is confidential and what is top-secret. 
Parker further contends that the strategy to achieve confidentiality may also need to change. 
Instead of the traditional military-origin “need-to-know” principle, a new discretionary “need-
to-withhold” principle should be adopted. The latter principle suggests that an organization is 
better off by giving everyone in the organization its information except for a small amount that 
must be withheld. Another strategy is to rely on the rapid obsolescence of secret information 
rather than trying to protect it. For example, by the time competitors obtain the trade secret 
information, it may have already been obsolete and useless. 
3.2.2 Culture 
In the KM ontology, culture refers to norms, beliefs, and basic assumptions shared by the 
members of an organization. In the IS security literature, the importance of organizational 
culture has been recognized. Information systems security is not a technical problem, but a 
social and organizational one that involves people because it is them that operate and use those 
systems (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). An organizational subculture and a common belief 
system are needed to make members of the organization committed to their activities that might 
have impacts on IS security (Dhillon, 1999). Such culture should also promote responsibility, 
integrity of people, trustworthiness, and ethicality (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). 
Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) took a step further to study IS security issues in terms of the 
values of people from an organizational perspective. By using the value-focused thinking to 
identify fundamental objectives for IS security and the means to achieve them, their study 
suggests that organizationally grounded principles and values are necessary for maintaining 
security of information systems in organizations. More specifically, Dhillon and Torkzadeh 
identified 25 clusters of objectives held by organizational members for IS security.  There are 
nine fundamental objectives and 16 means objectives. Examples of fundamental objectives 
include enhancing management development practices, maximizing integrity of business 
processes, and maximizing organizational integrity. Examples of mean objectives include 
increasing trust, providing open communication, and maximizing awareness. These objectives 
can be used for developing IS security measures. 
Smith and Hasnas (1999) investigated the ethical issues in information systems in general. 
While raising an important issue of ethics in IS, their study identifies some challenges facing 
organizations when they deal with ethical dilemmas. One of the challenges is that applying 
different ethical theories on the same ethical situation may have conflicting conclusions. Thus, 
it is important for organizations to pay attention to this issue and have a clear communication 
with employees in terms of what kinds of behavior are considered ethical and acceptable 






In the KM ontology, infrastructure refers to an organization’s roles, their relationships, and the 
regulations that govern them. In the context of information system security, policy, as one type 
of organizational regulation, is of particular interest. 
Security policy refers to the set of rules, and practices that regulate how an organization 
manages, protects, and distributes its resources to achieve specified security objectives (Sterne, 
1991). Security objectives are often reflected in the purpose and strategy as discussed 
previously. Recognizing the limitation of existing security policy approach, Baskerville and 
Siponen (2002) proposed a meta-policy as a guide to establish how policies should be created, 
implemented, and enforced. Some of the policy features are: 1) policy requirements, which 
include identification and classification of security subjects and objects, as well as the 
elaboration of the process by which the organization will determine who need to access what 
information; 2) How policies is designed, e.g. the creation of policy and sub-policies hierarchy 
and when the adjustment of the level of abstraction and enforcement needed; and 3) How 
policies are to be implemented,  and if necessary how they should be tested in order to 
determine whether the goals of policies are met. 
Siponen and Iivari, on the other hand, take a different theoretical perspective to study the 
design of successful IS security polices and guidelines (2006). They identify six normative 
theories that can offer insights on how IS policies and guidelines handle exceptional situations, 
where business opportunities may require temporary violations of those policies and guidelines. 
Marchinkowski and Stanton (2003) analyzed extant information security policies from a 
number of organizations to ascertain the motivational assumption. Although motivation is just 
one of several factors associated with effective policy, the study found that motivation factors 
do not receive enough attention in the research or practitioner literatures. It also raised a 
question of how information security figures into employees’ performance evaluations. 
3.2.4 Artifacts 
An artifact in the KM ontology refers to an object is or hold a representation of knowledge that 
may be useful for a knowledge processor in the organization. Examples of such artifact include 
documents and reports. In the IS security context, Belsis et al (2005) conducted a field research 
and identified a number of security-related knowledge artifact (“sources”). These artifacts can 
be classified into three levels of abstraction: strategic, tactical, and operations. Strategic-level 
artifacts include security policy document, which deals with the design and dissemination of 
security policies. At tactical level, the artifacts include risk analysis document, documented 
countermeasures, audit trail reports, automatic logs, and audit documentation. At the operations 
level, the knowledge artifacts include network alerts and logs. 
Two types of artifacts widely used in information systems security are checklist and standards. 
Checklists are based on the assumption that solutions and procedures can be observed and 
turned into a list, hence “checklist”, for solving security problems (Siponen, 2005). Examples 
 
 
of such IS security checklists include the risk checklist proposed by Moulton & Moulton (1996) 
and the control checklist proposed by Wood et al (1987). IS security standards are usually the 
best practices for managing security in organizations. One example of such standards is 
ISO/IEC 27002. The standard “establishes guidelines and general principles for initiating, 
implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in an 
organization” (ISO/IEC, 2005). It contains best practices of control objectives and controls in 
areas of information security management such as security policy, physical and environmental 
security, access control, among others. 
3.2.5 Participants’ knowledge 
In the KM ontology, participant’s knowledge refers the knowledge that is possessed by a 
knowledge processor who participates in the organization’s business activities. Participants can 
be employees, customers, or suppliers, among others. In the IS security context, however, 
research seemed to have been focusing on employees who use the organization’s information 
systems to carry out their routine business activities. 
From a domain perspective, employees’ knowledge can be classified as business knowledge 
and information technology (IT) knowledge. Information systems security knowledge can be 
viewed as a sub-category of IT knowledge. Understandably, as a common sense IT and IS 
security people have necessary IT knowledge to manage organizational information systems; 
and end-users (or business people) have necessary business knowledge to carry business 
activities and make critical decisions. 
In order to achieve effective security management, however, IT people should also have 
necessary business knowledge. Such business knowledge is critical for IT people to understand 
how IT risks impact the organization’s business performance and to manage security in a cost-
effective manner. It will also enable IT people to have better communications with end-users 
and business people. Such knowledge is also defined as “business competence of IT 
professionals” (Bassellier & Benbasat, 2004), which is comprised of organization-specific 
knowledge and interpersonal and management knowledge. The former can be further broken 
down to more specific areas of knowledge: organizational overview, organizational unit, 
organizational responsibility, and IT-business integration; and the latter can be broken down to 
areas of knowledge networking, interpersonal communication, and leadership. 
IT knowledge of end-users is equally important for effective security management. Lack of 
necessary IT knowledge and skills causes human errors, which are a significant issue for 
information systems security (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Such IT knowledge and skills are also 
defined as “IT competence” (Bassellier et al, 2001). 
Based on its mode, IT competence can be classified as explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge 
(Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1962). Explicit knowledge is often codified and can be transmitted in 
formal and systematic language; tacit knowledge, on the other hand, involves personal quality 
and is difficult to be formalized and transmitted. Based on Bassellier et al’s classification, end-
users’ explicit IT knowledge include knowledge in areas of technology, applications, systems 
development, management of IT, and access to IT knowledge (e.g. knowing who to contact for 
more information on IT); tacit knowledge includes end-users’ experience in IT projects and 
experience in the management of IT. 
 
 
Based on its primary type, IT knowledge of end-users can be classified into descriptive, 
procedural, and reasoning knowledge (Holsapple & Whinston, 1996). Each of them describes 
some different aspect of a knowledge object. Descriptive knowledge is about the “state of some 
world”, which include descriptions of past, present, future, and hypothetical situations. It is 
about “know what”. Procedural knowledge is about the detailed procedures of doing 
something. It is about “know how”. Reasoning knowledge, however, specifies the conclusions 
that can be drawn from certain pre-conditions. It is about “know why”. It can be argued that 
this classification scheme loosely reflects the “depth” of knowledge. Descriptive knowledge is 
the least in-depth while reasoning knowledge is the most in-depth understanding of a subject 
matter. According to this classification, the explicit IT knowledge (Bassellier et al., 2001) falls 
into the category of descriptive knowledge, because it focuses on “the understanding of benefits 
of different IT, not on their specific features”. 
In the IS security context, some studies focused on the end-users’ awareness of security 
problem. Such awareness can also be classified as a descriptive knowledge in terms of general 
understanding of security issues but without in-depth “know-how” and “know-why”. Siponen 
(2000; 2001) investigated IS security awareness from a human behavioral perspective and 
argued that more focus should be put on normative and prescriptive awareness. 
3.3 Knowledge Manipulation Activity 
In the KM ontology, knowledge manipulation activity refers to the acquisition, selection, 
generation, assimilation, and emission of knowledge, which occur in the “conduct of 
knowledge management” (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004). 
In the IS security context, organizational security planning is one of such knowledge 
manipulation activities. Straub and Welke (1998) proposed a security planning model for 
management decision-making on security issues. The security risk planning model includes 
four phases: 1) recognition of security problem or need; 2) risk analysis; 3) alternatives 
generation; and 4) planning decision. Each phase involves some processes of knowledge 
resources. For example, risk analysis may involves an understanding of organizational strategy, 
end-users’ general level of IT knowledge and skills, and the design documentation of an 
information system, among others. Such analysis may generate a list of risks and their 
priorities. Taking this knowledge of risk as an input, the next phase may generate a list of 
alternatives that might alleviate the risks. This kind of knowledge activities may go on until a 
decision is made. The output could be a documented IS security strategy, which is also a 
knowledge resource according to the KM ontology. 
A similar approach is the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) Framework (Alberts et al, 1999). The OCTAVE framework has three phases: 1) 
building enterprise-wide security requirement; 2) identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities; and 
3) demining security risk management strategy. Similar to that of previous approach, each 
phase in this OCTAVE framework involves the knowledge manipulation activities. For 
example, in the first phase of assessment, several types of knowledge need to be analyzed: 




4 Discussion and Future Research 
This paper reviewed research in information systems security from a knowledge management 
perspective. More specifically, it applied the knowledge management ontology to investigate 
knowledge and knowledge activities associated with IS security. It found that the current IS 
security research on non-technical factors has been focusing on three aspects: knowledge 
resources, knowledge manipulation activities, and learning. 
There has not been sufficient research, however, on the other two aspects of knowledge 
management ontology: knowledge influence and projection. Knowledge influences include 
managerial, resources, and environmental factors, all of which could impact the overall security 
management organizations. It is not clear, however, how and to what extent these factors 
impact IS security. One research in this direction is the study by Knapp et al (2006). They 
found that top management’s support is a significant predictor of security culture and policy 
enforcement in organizations. 
Projection is the other aspect that future research could be conducted. One specific area is 
security knowledge sharing among organizations such as businesses, software vendors, and 
security solution providers. Possible research questions include how and why organizations 
share security knowledge such as virus information and software vulnerabilities, what benefits 
organizations can achieve by sharing such knowledge, and what factors encourage or 
discourage organizations to share their security knowledge. 
The literature review also revealed two issues that worth further research. The first issue is 
what kind of strategy can best manage information systems security. Parker (1997) contrasted 
two different strategies: need-to-know approach and need-to-withhold approach. The question 
is, can the latter approach perform better than the former? What are the conditions, 
environmental or organizational, should be met in order for this to happen? The second issue is 
what level of business knowledge is needed for IT professionals and what level of IT 
knowledge is needed for business people and end-users. Although prior research suggested that 
both types of knowledge are important for the two groups of people, it is still unclear what level 
of knowledge is optimal. 
References 
Alberts, C. J., Behrens, S. G., Pethia, R. D., & Wilson, W. R. (1999). Operationally Critical 
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Valuation (OCTAVE) Framework. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute. 
Argyris, C. (1986). Skilled incompetence. Harvard Business Review, 64(5), 74-79. 
Argyris, C. (1995). Action science and organizational learning. Journal of Managerial 
Psychology, 10(6), 20-26. 
Argyris, C., Putnam, R., & Smith, D. M. (1985). Action science (1st ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Baskerville, R. L., & Siponen, M. (2002). An information security meta-policy for emergent 
organizations. Logistics Information Management, 15, 337-346. 
Bassellier, G., & Benbasat, I. (2004). Business Competence of Information Technology 
Professionals: Conceptual Development and Influence on It-Business Partnerships. MIS 
Quarterly, 28(4), 673-694. 
 
 
Bassellier, G., Reich, B. H., & Benbasat, I. (2001). Information Technology Competence of 
Business Managers: A Definition and Research Model. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 17(4), 159-182. 
Belsis, P., Kokolakis, S., & Kiountouzis, E. (2005). Information systems security from a 
knowledge management perspective. Information Management & Computer Security, 
13(3), 189-202. 
Dhillon, G. (1999). Managing and controlling computer abuse. Information Management & 
Computer Security, 7(4), 171-175. 
Dhillon, G., & Backhouse, J. (2000). Information systems security management in the new 
millennium. Communications of the ACM, 43(7), 125-128. 
Dhillon, G., & Torkzadeh, G. (2006). Value-focused assessment of information system security 
in organizations. Information Systems Journal, 16, 293-314. 
Dutta, A., & McCrohan, K. (2002). Management's role in information security in a cyber 
economy. California Management Review, 45(1), 67-87. 
Gruber, T. R. (1995). Toward principles for the design of ontologies used for knowledge 
sharing. International Journal of Human and Computer Studies, 43(5/6), 907-928. 
Hitchings, J. (1995). Deficiencies of the traditional approach to information security and the 
requirements for a new methodology. Computer & Security, 14, 377-383. 
Holsapple, C. W., & Joshi, K. D. (2003). A knowledge management ontology. In C. W. 
Holsapple (Ed.), Handbook on Knowledge Management (Vol. 1, pp. 89-124). Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Holsapple, C. W., & Joshi, K. D. (2004). A formal knowledge management ontology: Conduct, 
activities, resources, and influences. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology, 55(7), 593-612. 
Holsapple, C. W., & Whinston, A. B. (1996). Decision Support Systems : A Knowledge-Based 
Approach. Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Pub. Co. 
Im, G. P., & Baskerville, R. L. (2005). A longitudinal study of information system threat 
categories: The enduring problem of human error. The DATA BASE for Advances in 
Information Systems, 36(4), 68-79. 
ISO/IEC. (2005). Information Technology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 27002). Geneva, Switzerland: International 
Organization for Standardization. 
Knapp, K. J., Marshall, T. E., Rainer, R. K., & Ford, F. N. (2006). Information security: 
Management's effect on culture and policy. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 14(1), 24-36. 
Kotulic, A. G., & Clark, J. G. (2004). Why there aren't more information security research 
studies. Information & Management, 41(597-607). 
Marcinkowski, S., & Stanton, J. M. (2003). Motivational aspects of information security 
policies. Paper presented at the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics. 
Mattia, A., & Dhillon, G. (2003). Applying double loop learning to interpret implications for 
information systems security design, IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics (Vol. 3, pp. 2521-2526). 
Moulton, R. T., & Moulton, M. E. (1996). Electronic communication risk management: A 
checklist for business managers. Computer & Security, 15(5), 377-386. 
Neumann, P. G. (1995). Computer-Related Risks. New York: ACM Press. 
 
 
Nonaka, I. (1994). A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. Organization 
Science, 5(1), 14. 
Parker, D. B. (1997). The strategic values of information security in business. Computer & 
Security, 16, 572-582. 
Polanyi, M. (1962). Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. New York: 
Harper Torchbooks. 
Siponen, M. T. (2005). An analysis of the traditional IS security approaches: Implications for 
research and practices. European Journal of Information Systems, 14, 303-315. 
Siponen, M. T. (2000). A conceptual foundation for organizational information security 
awareness. Information Management & Computer Security, 8(1), 31-41. 
Siponen, M. T. (2001). Five Dimensions of Information Security Awareness. ACM SIGCAS 
Computers and Society, 31(2), 24-29. 
Siponen, M., & Iivari, J. (2006). Six design theories for IS security policies and guidelines. 
Journal of the Association of Information Systems, 7(7), 445-472. 
Smith, H. J., & Hasnas, J. (1999). Ethics and information systems: The corporate domain. MIS 
Quarterly, 23(1), 109-127. 
Sterne, D. F. (1991). On the buzzword "security policy", IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy (pp. 219-230). 
Straub, D. W., & Welke, R. J. (1998). Coping with systems risk: Security planning models for 
management decision-making. MIS Quarterly, 22(4), 441-469. 
TJX. (2007a). Annual Report of 2006: The TJX Companies, Inc. 
TJX. (2007b). Quaterly Report of The TJX Companies, Inc (SEC Form 10-Q, for the Quaterly 
Period Ended April 28, 2007). 
Wood, C. C., Banks, W. W., Guarro, S. B., Garcia, A. A., Hampel, V. E., & Sartorio, H. P. 
(1987). Computer Security: A Comprehensive Controls Checklist. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
